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Abstract
Both Skow (2007) and Callender (2008) independently argue that time can be distin-
guished from space due to the special role it plays in our laws of nature: our laws deter-
mine the behaviour of physical systems across time, but not across space. In this work
we asses the claim that the laws of nature might provide the basis for distinguishing time
from space by looking specifically at the claims of Skow and Callender. We find that
there is an obvious reason to be sceptical of the argument Skow submits for distinguishing
time from space: Skow fails to pay sufficient attention to the relationship between the
dynamical laws and the antecedent conditions required to establish a complete solution
from the laws. Callender’s more sophisticated argument in favour of distinguishing time
from space by virtue of the laws of nature presents a much stronger basis to draw the
distinction. We raise, however, the possibility that Callender’s account in a certain sense
shifts the bump in the carpet: that laws are more ‘informative’ in the temporal direction
seems to call out for an underlying explanation, and whatever this underlying factor is,
surely this is the real distinction between time and space.
1 Introduction
It is very natural to suppose that there is a substantial difference between time and space.
But what exactly is that difference? Two of our best known models of space and time – the
system derived from Newton’s theory of gravitation and mechanics, and the system that arises
from the special and general theories of relativity, which superseded the former – diverge in
the answer they provide to this question. In Newtonian spacetime, time has a clear direction
that definitively distinguishes it from the spatial directions, whereas in generally relativistic
spacetime temporal and spatial directions are inexorably interwoven. The shift from Newtonian
to relativistic mechanics may seem to bring with it the death of difference: time and space
appear to be no different in kind. But there is some distinction to be drawn between spacelike
and timelike orientations in relativistic spacetime, a distinction that is ultimately encoded
within both the mathematical signature of the metric and its causal structure. Despite this,
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general relativity does not provide a great deal of insight into what that difference ultimately
amounts to, metaphysically speaking.
There have been two attempts in recent times to clarify the exact difference between time
and space. Both of these accounts, though independent, emphasise the unique role that time
plays in the laws of nature: our laws determine the behaviour of physical systems across time,
but not across space. The first of these accounts, due to Skow (2007), claims that the reason we
never have evolution in a spatial direction is that such a schema would leave us with a paucity
of information concerning physical behaviour in a four-dimensional spacetime region. That is,
given information at, say, some location in space for all time, any physical laws resembling our
current laws will not provide complete information concerning what is going on everywhere else
at any time. The second of these accounts, due to Callender (2008), claims that time is the
“great informer” in the sense that it discriminates the direction in the manifold of events in
which the laws of nature provide maximal determination of the behaviour of physical systems.
That is, given certain properties of a large class of our laws, these laws work most informatively
in the temporal direction.
In this work we asses the general claim that the laws of nature might provide the basis
for distinguishing time from space by looking specifically at the claims of Skow and Callender.
After we present Skow’s account in §2, we outline in §3 an obvious reason to be sceptical of the
argument Skow submits for distinguishing time from space. In short, Skow fails to pay sufficient
attention to the relationship between the form of dynamical laws and the dimensionality of the
antecedent conditions required to establish a complete solution from the laws. In §4 we turn
to Callender’s more sophisticated arguments in favour of distinguishing time from space by
virtue of the laws of nature. We find these arguments to be a much stronger basis to draw the
distinction. However, in §5 we raise the possibility that Callender’s account in a certain sense
shifts the bump in the carpet: that laws are more ‘informative’ in the temporal direction seems
to call out for an underlying explanation, and whatever this underlying factor is, surely this is
the real distinction between time and space. We conclude in §6.
2 Time as the preferred direction of laws
Skow (2007, p.237) outlines the following position concerning the distinction between the spatial
and temporal directions in spacetime:
Timelike and spacelike directions play different roles in the laws of physics. . . Those laws govern
the evolution of the world in timelike directions, but not in spacelike directions.
Skow takes the fundamental difference between time and space to be that the laws of physics
determine behaviour by evolution in time, but they do not determine behaviour by evolution in
space. This is not supposed to be a trivial claim; evolution is not to be interpreted analytically
as evolution in time. Rather we are to think of evolution as the determination of physical
behaviour in some spatiotemporal direction, where that direction is determined by the relation
between the laws of physics and the data required by the laws: the antecedent data comprises
some subset of the complete information describing physical behaviour in some four-dimensional
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spacetime region and the laws determine the complete information given this antecedent data.
Here is Skow (2007, p.237):
Roughly speaking, by ‘the laws govern the evolution of the world’ in some direction I mean
that the laws, together with complete information about what is going on in some region of
spacetime, yield complete information about (or assign probabilities to complete descriptions
of) what is going on in regions of spacetime that lie in that direction from the initial region.
Thus, given an amount of information concerning some subset of spacetime that corresponds
to the data required to provide a well-posed initial value problem for some physical laws, we can
produce enough information to describe physical behaviour in some four-dimensional spacetime
region, and the direction from the initial region to the complete region is the direction of
evolution. This is straightforwardly the case when the direction of evolution coincides with
the direction of time. We take initial data on some spacelike surface and employ physical laws
that require such data in order to determine the behaviour of some system throughout some
four-dimensional region that includes the spacelike surface as an initial temporal boundary, so
long as the initial data and the laws comprise a well-posed initial value problem. The laws
thus govern evolution from one time to another. This is precisely the structure we take to be
typically characteristic of physics.
Skow’s claim, then, is that the distinction between time and space consists in physical laws
evolving in the direction of time, but never in the direction of space; we always take spacelike
surfaces (data at a time) as initial data, our laws always govern evolution in directions normal
to these surfaces, and thus evolution always occurs in the direction of timelike vectors. Skow
(2007, p.237) says as much:
Now, timelike vectors are not tangent to any time, on any way of partitioning any given
spacetime into times [spacelike surfaces]. Rather, no matter which partitioning of spacetime
into times you use, timelike vectors point from one time toward others. So timelike vectors
point in the directions in which the laws govern the evolution of the world.
And then continues:
The same is not true of points of space. If I know what is going on right here (at this
location in space) for all time, the laws do not give me complete information about (or assign
probabilities to complete descriptions of) what is going on anywhere else at any time.
According to Skow, the reason we never have evolution in a spatial direction is that such
a schema would leave us with a paucity of information concerning physical behaviour in a
four-dimensional spacetime region. Skow is correct to point out that given information at some
location in space for all time, any physical laws resembling our ordinary laws will not provide
complete information concerning what is going on everywhere else at all times. There is a very
good reason for this. Ordinarily our laws strike two practical balances to achieve a complete
specification of physical behaviour in a four-dimensional spacetime region. The first is between
the number of variables constituting the antecedent conditions and the order of the dynamical
law; and the second is between the number of dimensional components of these variables and
the corresponding dimension of the law. As a quick illustration we can consider second-order
dynamical equations, which comprise a large portion of our known physical laws. Second-order
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equations require the antecedent conditions to be constituted by two dependent variables; we
ordinarily take these to be the position and velocity initial conditions. Since we ordinarily take
initial data to extend across three spatial dimensions in our actual physical laws, these laws
must be three-dimensional, relating three components of each of the dependent variables to the
independent variable (which we ordinarily take to represent time).
It is usually trivial to add or subtract components to a dynamical equation to ensure the di-
mensionality of the equation and the initial data match. However, it is important for our present
purposes to note that the operation of the laws that we take to govern evolution in our world is
to extend the initial conditions across one further dimension that we call time (in a sense that
produces ‘dynamics’) – taking three-dimensional initial conditions to a four-dimensional dynam-
ical solution, or n-dimensional antecedent conditions to an n+ 1-dimensional solution. Thus, if
one of these laws (of appropriate dimensionality) took as its antecedent conditions information
at some location in space for all time (a simple line through four-dimensional spacetime), the
most that law could tell us would be information on some spatiotemporal plane to which the
initial line is parallel. This is not complete information concerning a four-dimensional region
of spacetime. Hence such a schema would not provide evolution in a spatial direction and this
would leave us with a clear distinction between timelike and spacelike directions.
Given Skow’s criteria for evolution in some spatiotemporal direction, information concerning
some location in space for all time will never succeed in providing a system wherein the laws
govern the evolution of the world in a spacelike direction.
3 Dynamical laws and antecedent conditions
Having elucidated Skow’s position, we will now outline a difficulty for his account. Let us
consider in more depth the relationship between laws and antecedent conditions. If we want to
take some law to give us a representation of physical behaviour throughout a four-dimensional
region of spacetime, then there had better be a correspondence between the dimensionality
of the antecedent conditions and the dimensionality of the law. Given that the role of many
of our current physical laws is to extend antecedent data through one further dimension, in
order for the combination of the laws and the antecedent conditions to result in a description of
physical behaviour throughout a four-dimensional region of spacetime we require our antecedent
conditions to describe complete information across a three-dimensional sub-region of spacetime
(such as a spatial configuration at some time).
It is thus obvious why information concerning a single location in space at all times, com-
bined with our ordinary laws, will not result in a description of physical behaviour throughout a
four-dimensional region of spacetime: that information is incomplete. For any case in which the
antecedent conditions fail to yield complete information about a four-dimensional sub-region,
there are two possible modifications that we could make so as to achieve such complete in-
formation. One way would be to keep the antecedent conditions as they are and apply them
to more wide-reaching laws. To illustrate such a law, imagine the following highly simplified
scenario.
We have a universe in which each location in spacetime is simply a single many-valued
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property. We could think of this property as, say, colour; each location in spacetime is green,
or red, or blue, and so on. Information concerning a single location in space for all time would
consist in a linear series of colours. We could now imagine a law that took this information as
an antecedent condition and determined the value of this property throughout four-dimensional
spacetime. For instance, the universe is a single colour at each time. Thus, given a linear series
of colours at a single location in space, and the law stipulating uniform colour at each time, we
have complete information concerning four-dimensional spacetime.
A second way that we might achieve complete information is to keep our ordinary laws and
expand the scope of the antecedent conditions instead, by feeding in more information. In the
case where we take our laws to give evolution in time, we expect our antecedent conditions to
contain total information about three spatial dimensions at some part of the manifold (such
as a total spatial configuration at some time). Similarly, equivalent laws evolving in space
would also require antecedent conditions that are three-dimensional – in this case, we would
need complete information concerning two dimensions of space and one dimension of time at
some part of the manifold. Given such information and the requisite laws, we could compute
complete information concerning four-dimensional spacetime.
We are now in a position to see why Skow’s account is deficient. When discussing the
evolution of our ordinary laws over time, Skow feeds in total information about the three spatial
dimensions that correspond to a particular time. Which is to say that, for some time, tp, a
complete three-dimensional specification in the spatial dimensions comprises the antecedent
conditions. This yields total information for all t < tp and t > tp. He argues that the analogous
operation in the spatial case does not yield total information. The analogous operation in
the spatial case, however, would be this: for some spatial location, say, zq, a complete three-
dimensional specification consisting of information about the remaining two spatial dimensions
plus information about the temporal dimension would constitute the antecedent conditions.
The laws should then enable one to extrapolate information for all z < zq and z > zq (see Fig.1
for a representation of the two cases). In short: in the temporal case, we extrapolate from
information about all three spatial dimensions at a time. In the spatial case, we extrapolate
from information about two spatial dimensions and all of time at a point in space.
But the spatial extrapolation represented in Fig.1(ii) is not the kind of operation that Skow
considers. Rather, Skow considers cases in which one takes partial information about some
part of space, which may or may not include information about time, and then one attempts
to extrapolate across all of spacetime (see Fig.2 for a representation). Consider, for instance,
Skow’s fourth (and most realistic, because it uses actual quantum laws) example of using laws
to extrapolate information across space, rather than time (Skow, 2007, p.246):
Example 4: In this world, the laws of quantum mechanics govern the world. In an EPR-type
experiment, there are two particles some distance apart, and if we measure the spin on one
of them in some direction, we know with certainty the outcome of a measurement of spin
of the other particle in that same direction, even if the measurement of events are spacelike
separated. So these laws govern the evolution of the world in a spacelike direction.
Skow concedes that one can gain information about one part of spacetime based on information
about a measured particle in another part of spacetime plus the laws, but goes on to argue
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Figure 1: A representation of temporal and spatial evolution: (i) represents an extrapolation
through time via the laws; (ii) represents the analogous extrapolation through space.
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Figure 2: Skow’s proposed extrapolation through space.
that there is no way to use the same laws in such a case to extrapolate all of the information
about the entire four-dimensional manifold. He extends precisely the same reasoning to each of
the three cases of a law governing the evolution of the world across space that he considers. In
each case he admits that some information about another region of spacetime may be gained
via the relevant laws, but denies that information about the whole manifold can be gathered.
Each of the cases that Skow considers can be represented by Fig.2. Limited information
about a particular spatial region is used to try and gain information about all of spacetime.
The crucial missing ingredient is time: in order to extrapolate all of the information about a
complete four-dimensional spacetime from two dimensions of space, full information about the
temporal dimension is needed. In the cases he presents, no temporal information is used. It is
unsurprising, then, that only limited information about spacetime is yielded. In essence, the
cases that Skow considers are the wrong cases to be focusing on. What we need to look at are
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cases that are like those represented by Fig.1(ii). Because Skow does not consider any of those
cases, he has failed to show what he sets out to prove in §8 of his paper: namely that it is
impossible for there to be laws that govern the evolution of the world across space in the same
way that the laws govern the evolution of the world across time. The relevant impossibility
result is crucial to Skow’s account of the difference between the spatial and temporal directions
of spacetime. For, as he notes, his “view entails that it is not possible that there be laws that
govern the evolution of the world [in] a spacelike direction”. Given this entailment, if it is
possible that the laws govern the evolution of the world across space in exactly the manner in
which they govern the evolution of the world across time, then that is sufficient to show that
the essential difference between time and space cannot be to do with the fact that the laws can
govern the evolution of the world across the former but cannot across the latter.
Of course, all we have shown is that Skow has not yet addressed an objection he thought he
had put to rest. It is therefore interesting to inquire as to whether there are any plausible cases
of spatial evolution in the sense of Fig.1(ii). For it is one thing to note that Skow has failed to
rule such cases out as being impossible, quite another to show that there are such cases in the
offing. If there are no such cases, then that would seem to strengthen Skow’s conviction that
the distinction between time and space ultimately resides with the manner in which the laws
govern evolution across spacetime, even if his way of developing that distinction is ultimately
too strong. In order to make our point more forcefully, then, let us consider an example that
looks to be evolution in space of the kind that we deem to be acceptable, and the kind that we
believe Skow has failed to take into consideration.
Consider classical electromagnetism. Classical action principles of the sort found in electro-
magnetism generally require that the field boundary is fixed on a closed hypersurface, wherein
the timelike parts of the boundary are just as important as the spacelike parts. Determining
physical behaviour as a solution to the action integral involves integrating over the spacetime
region enclosed by the boundary. It is interesting to note that neither the integral over space
nor over time has any precedence over the other: the solution will comprise the same action for
the same field in the same spacetime region regardless of whether we represent the integral as
‘evolving’ a spacelike hypersurface in time or a timelike hypersurface in space. If we imagine
an electromagnetic system consisting of a perfect conductor at some location which constrains
some of the electric and magnetic field components to be zero, so long as there are no other
boundary conditions, an analysis of the fields near the conductor might appear as though the
field is ‘evolving’ in a spatial direction away from the conductor, a` la Fig.1(ii).
While we take this example from electromagnetism to provide a clear counterexample to
Skow’s arguments regarding the distinctiveness of time, we do not wish to argue that this sort
of example provides good evidence for a strong nomic symmetry between space and time (for
reasons to which we will return in the context of the discussion in §5). But we do hope to have
shown that this is the kind of spatially directed law that Skow needs to take into account to
make his arguments at all convincing. Let us now turn to a second attempt to differentiate
time from space, an attempt that lies in a similar vein to Skow’s but that does not face the
difficulty we have outlined in this section.
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4 Time as the “great informer”
Callender (2008) makes a closely related but much more robust attempt to address the funda-
mental difference between time and space; similarly to Skow, Callender identifies the laws of
nature as the key to understanding the distinction. The feature that differentiates time from
space, according to Callender, is that time is the “great informer”: time is the direction in
the manifold in which the greatest amount of information can be generated by the smallest
set of antecedent conditions. This sort of informativeness – “generating some pieces of the
domain of events given other pieces” (Callender, 2008, p.3) – is a hallmark of a good balance
between strength and simplicity in a best systems theory of laws, where the goal is to provide
as accurate a description of as much of the world as possible in the most succinct manner.1
Thus, for Callender, “time is that direction in spacetime in which we can tell the strongest or
most informative stories” (Callender, 2008, p.4).
To understand how effective Callender’s maxim is at distinguishing time from space, we
can consider these notions of strength and informativeness in terms of how much of the actual
world some system of laws manages to imply. While a deterministic system (i.e. one that
generates the world completely) is the strongest such system, indeterministic systems can be
strong too (in particular, Markovian systems of laws). But, as Callender points out, a formal
characteristic of a system of laws that turns out to be even stronger for us than determinism is
that the system comprises a ‘well-posed Cauchy problem’. Let us be explicit about what this
means.
Cauchy problems are characterised by seeking out a solution to a dynamical equation (usu-
ally a partial differential equation (PDE)) given antecedent data (so-called Cauchy data) spec-
ified on a hypersurface in the domain of the solution (in our case, the manifold). The problem
is ‘well-posed’ if a solution (i) exists for any possible antecedent conditions, (ii) is unique, and
(iii) changes continuously with the antecedent conditions. This latter condition is relevant for
understanding the qualifier ‘for us ’: small errors in specifying the antecedent conditions lead
only to small errors in our determination of the subsequent dynamics. So, for creatures such
as us with the sorts of practical concerns we have regarding what sort of information we are
interested in, plus the limitations we are under with respect to the information we are capable
of gathering, the most informative dynamical laws appear to be well-posed Cauchy problems.
Thus, for us, well-posed Cauchy problems tell the most informative stories.
The next step in Callender’s argument is that, given that very many of our most important
dynamical laws are second-order linear PDEs, only a specific subclass of second-order linear
PDEs admit well-posed Cauchy problems – hyperbolic PDEs. This is important for Callender’s
argument because, mathematically, hyperbolicity places certain restrictions on the kind of
boundaries that can be used to solve such differential equations. Part of the reason for this is
1See Lewis (1983, 1994) for an outline of the best systems approach. Note that Cohen and Callender (2009)
have recently offered a new version of the theory (see also Schrenk (2014)), according to which there are many
best systems, each indexed to a particular use of expressive resources (which, in turn, is linked to the domain
of science in which the best system is being developed). The possibility of multiple best systems may make
Callender’s position hard to sustain, since there may be a best system in which space and not time is the great
informer. Presumably, however, Callender will maintain that the best system associated with fundamental
physics is the system that should tell us the fundamental difference between time and space, if there is one.
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that any physical signals that emerge from the solution to a Cauchy problem must propagate
in accordance with the hyperbolic dispersion relations of the relevant differential equation, and
doing so endows the solution with a causal structure (in a sense, solutions ‘evolve causally’ from
the antecedent boundary). Accordingly, physical solutions to well-posed Cauchy problems must
respect this causal structure and thus only certain types of antecedent conditions will be able to
accommodate such solutions. It just so happens that the appropriate antecedent conditions that
respect this structure, and thus admit solutions to well-posed Cauchy problems, are spacelike
hypersurfaces. So only hyperbolic PDEs admit well-posed Cauchy problems, and hyperbolic
PDEs pick out a causal structure such that their admissible antecedent conditions are spacelike,
and thus what we interpret as evolution must happen in a direction normal to these surfaces.
When we put all this together we see that, since well-posed Cauchy problems tell the most
informative stories, the most informative stories are told in a direction normal to spacelike
hypersurfaces. Since we have identified time here as the direction in which we tell the most
informative stories, time must be the direction normal to spacelike hypersurfaces. Thus, “well-
posed Cauchy problems pick out temporal directions” (Callender, 2008, p.7).
While we are largely in agreement with Callender’s account concerning the distinction be-
tween time and space, we would like in the next section to identify and discuss what we take
to be places of potential weakness.
5 ‘Drawing’ a distinction?
It seems that Callender has managed to provide a much stronger connection than Skow between
the laws of nature and the distinction between time and space. According to the best systems
account of laws, the laws of nature are those that satisfy the trade-off between simplicity and
strength. While it may certainly be possible that there are dynamical laws that are informative
in a spatial direction, Callender’s claim is that such laws simply would not be included in
the best systems account since they could not be as simple or as strong as well-posed Cauchy
problems (which pick out the temporal direction as the direction of evolution). So for Callender
the difference between time and space is that time, as opposed to space, can be used to build
simpler laws of nature that give maximal information about spacetime. Thus the first minor
point that we would like to make is that Callender’s position is not quite that time is the ‘great
informer’ – it is not implausible that space be just as great an informer but still not be included
in the best systems account – his claim is that time is the simplest or most efficient way of
informing via law.
So the key to Callender’s argument is that there cannot be laws that inform across space
that are more simple (and just as informative) than our laws that inform across time. Put
this way, one can see an area of overlap between Callender’s account and Skow’s. Given scant
antecedent data of the sort that would be required for laws to inform across space (such as
is depicted in Fig.1(ii), for instance), it seems likely that strong informative laws would need
to be overly complex. If there were to be spatially directed laws simple enough to compete
with temporally directed laws on a best systems account, then it had better be the case that
antecedent data of a similar dimensionality to a spacelike hypersurface be required to make the
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spatially directed laws maximally informative. But we rarely (if ever) have access to this sort
of antecedent data, so in this sense spatially directed laws will in all likelihood be less simple
than temporally directed laws for us.
The question remains, however, whether this distinction between time and space with re-
gards to the simplicity and strength of laws in each of the directions indicates a fundamental
difference between time and space themselves, or simply reinforces that we have a vastly dif-
ferent relationship to the two directions in our experience of the world. There are two points
that we would like to make in accordance with this question. The first concerns the possibility
that we already have at least some laws that look to be spatially directed – for instance, the
example from classical electromagnetism from the end of §3. While we noted there that this
case provides a clear counterexample to Skow’s arguments, there is good reason to be sceptical
of grounding a strong nomic symmetry between space and time on cases like this one. Even
for classical action principles of the sort found in electromagnetism, time and space cannot be
treated as identical. The reasons for this are essentially those given by Callender (2008, p.9).
For a start, the metric signature of time differs from that of space, and we can take this to be an
expression of the hyperbolicity of field theories like electromagnetism. And, as we noted above,
hyperbolic equations pick out a causal structure wherein the admissible antecedent conditions
are spacelike. When we further note that there is no general theory for existence and uniqueness
of solutions to boundary value problems with timelike antecedent conditions (which, recall, are
two of the conditions for well-posedness), the possibility for timelike Cauchy data looks rather
slim.2
Be that as it may, there is no reason yet to suppose that the lack of well-posed Cauchy
problems with timelike antecedent boundary data is due to some deep mathematical asymmetry
between time and space. At least, if there is such a deep asymmetry, it has not been discovered.
The lack of existence and uniqueness theorems in particular may be entirely due to the manner
in which the antecedent data available to us is impoverished in important respects: it is not
usually the case that we have timelike antecedent boundary data available to us and this could
very be why no existence or uniqueness theorems for Cauchy problems across space have been
produced. If we were in a position to have access to the right sort of data more generally, those
theorems may indeed be forthcoming.
In light of this, there is a possible, albeit somewhat speculative, critique that might be
levelled at Callender’s position concerning the distinction between time and space. Callender
repeatedly refers to creatures like ‘us’ when discussing the strength and simplicity of temporally
directed dynamical laws. We have seen that this strength and simplicity is closely connected
to the nature of the antecedent conditions needed by the laws. One might therefore argue
that the distinction between time and space based on informativeness has more to do with
the availability of information for us, rather than any deep fundamental difference between
time and space themselves. The story would look something like the following. Due to some
feature about ourselves, we live and have access to data exclusively on spacelike hypersurfaces,
one at a time. Since we are constrained to such hypersurfaces we can only hope to predict
2Although, see Weinstein (2008) for an exploration of existence and uniqueness of solutions to boundary
value problems with timelike boundaries.
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data on other spacelike hypersurfaces, and we have developed scientific practices that reflect
this. It then turns out that the best, most efficient, and most informative models developed
by these scientific practices admit only antecedent data on spacelike hypersurfaces. We might
conclude that there is something fundamentally special about the direction normal to this
antecedent data, that singles it out from amongst the other directions. But we might also
conclude that what makes this direction special is not fundamental at all, but is a function
of our special epistemic vantage point from within the manifold. Because we have exclusively
spacelike information available to us, then for us limited beings the laws that are simpler for us
are the ones that inform in what we call the temporal direction. (And it would be no coincidence
that this aligns with the metric signature of time, since this is part of the same scientific model
expressing the casual structure that we see from our limited vantage point.) We simply do
not have access to the sort of information that would allow us to build models that inform in
some spatial direction. Perhaps if we had greater access to timelike information then we could
develop dynamical laws in a spatial direction that were just as simple and strong as our current
laws in the temporal direction. There would then be no deep difference in complexity between
the two kinds of law, and no deep difference between time and space.
In short, the difference between time and space that Callender has isolated may be merely
perspectival; a function of the epistemology of beings like us. The fact that timelike Cauchy data
appears hard to come by may be nothing more than a reflection on the way in which we gather
information, and the way in which we exist. For one of Kurt Vonnegut’s Tralfamadores – four-
dimensional beings who see the past as a valley to descend into and the future as a mountain to
climb – timelike Cauchy data may be commonplace. There is pressure on Callender to rule out
the perspectivel interpretation of his account. There are many differences between time and
space that are merely perspectival: we arguably experience time, and not space, as flowing; it
seems to us as though other places exist, but not other times; we cannot experience everything
in space at a time but we can experience everything in time at a particular spatial location
(longevity permitting); and so on. Each of these might mark a difference between time and
space, but each is due to our epistemic limitations as beings, or due to contingent facts about
our psychology. Because many differences between time and space are merely perspectival in
this manner, we need some assurance that the difference Callender identifies is not just one
more.
To sharpen the problem somewhat, consider that there could be beings who live under the
following epistemic limitation: they are just like us except that they do not have, available to
them, all of the information about space at a time. In other words, the spatial information
available to them is impoverished in a manner that is analogous to the way in which the
temporal information available to us is impoverished. Suppose that such beings go on to try to
formulate dynamical laws of nature. They would presumably not be able to come up with much.
According to whatever they do come up with, however, space and time are likely to be equally
poor informers. That is because well-posed Cauchy problems that enable extrapolation across
time would be just as hard to come by as well-posed Cauchy problems that enable extrapolation
across space. Such beings, then, would conclude that there is no difference between time and
space, at least if they accept Callender’s account of the difference between the two.
11
Now, Callender’s view has to be that these beings are mistaken. That they see no difference
between time and space is merely a function of the epistemic limitations under which they
labour. But if that criticism is on target, then we need to know why we are not also mistaken.
What reason do we have for thinking that our apparent detection of a difference between
time and space is not merely a function of the epistemic limitations under which we labour?
Callender does not appear to supply one. Of course, he might conclude that such beings are
not mistaken. They are correct to believe that, in their world, time is no different from space.
But this raises another problem. Plausibly, if time is different from space in a certain respect,
then necessarily time is different from space in that respect. After all, what we are trying to
do is come up with a plausible conceptual analysis of the difference between the two. That
analysis should tell us the necessary features of that difference. If, however, we conclude that
the beings under consideration – who have poor information about space available to them
due to epistemic limitations – are equally correct in their assessment about the difference
between time and space, then it is possible that time does not differ from space with respect
to the informativeness of the dynamical laws. This is possible, because such beings are clearly
possible.
In order to rule out the case just considered, we would need some reason to think that
beings who labour under the relevant epistemic limitations are impossible. Rather, all beings,
regardless of their epistemic situation, will always come up with a system of laws in which time,
and not space, is the great informer. Moreover, notice that such an explanation cannot appeal
to necessary facts about epistemic agents, for this certainly will collapse the distinction between
time and space being offered into something that is merely perspectival. If the reason why time
is always the great informer is ultimately to be explained in terms of necessary limitations on
epistemic beings, then it is clear that the difference between time and space being identified
has more to do with beings like us than anything else.
This last point raises a further issue for Callender, which is the second point we wish
to raise concerning the question of the fundamentality of the difference between time and
space. Suppose that the laws that inform across space are indeed more complex than the
laws that inform across time, as Callender claims should be the case. One is left to wonder
why this should be so. There appear to be two candidate explanations. First, the difference
in complexity could be entirely due to the antecedent data being fed into the laws; there is
no deep mathematical asymmetry between time and space that underwrites the difference.
If that’s the right explanation, however, then it really does look like the difference between
time and space is due to the availability (or lack thereof) of certain information to us. Given
the right information, well-posed timelike Cauchy problems across space should be statable.
Or, at least, we have no reason yet to think that this is not so, and thus that the difference
between time and space that Callender points to would persist were our epistemic situation to
be massively enriched with timelike data. Second, the difference in complexity could be due to
some hitherto unknown deep asymmetry in the mathematics. This is better: it would rule out
the epistemic interpretation. But it faces a further concern: whatever that asymmetry consists
in, surely that is the thing that’s marking the difference between time and space. For whatever
that asymmetry is, it ultimately explains why time and not space is the great informer.
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Either way, Callender has not identified a fundamental difference between time and space.
Either he has identified a difference that can be sheeted home to our epistemic situation or he
has identified a difference that can be sheeted home to some more fundamental mathematical
asymmetry, an asymmetry that deserves to be drawn out, explored and understood. In other
words, it is difficult to see what basis there could be for the conjecture that time is the great
infomer except thinking that there is some fundamental difference between time and space
that forces the increased nomic complexity of laws that govern the evolution of the world over
space. But then that factor – whatever it is – is the true difference between time and space;
the complexity of the most informative laws is just a symptom of that underlying factor.
Callender might respond by maintaining that it is just a brute fact that time is the great
informer and not space; there is no further explanation to be had. This might even be expected:
after all, if Callender has highlighted a fundamental difference between time and space, then
we should not expect there to be an answer to the question of why this difference holds. Our
point, however, is that Callender has not highlighted a fundamental difference between time
and space. He has, rather, highlighted a difference between various types of laws. But what
is it about time and space in virtue of which the laws display this type of difference? The
worry may be drawn out as follows: a fundamental difference between time and space should
be such that it holds even if the laws of nature are different. The difference that Callender has
highlighted, however, does not cohere with this basic thought. For if the laws of nature were
such that time and space were equally good informers, then the difference claimed between the
two would disappear. Of course, Callender might just maintain that it is impossible for time
and space to be equally good informers. But then we want to know why this is impossible: what
is it about time and space that rules this out? Nothing in Callender’s account seems to answer
this question. Moreover, any answer to this question would seem to be a better candidate for
being the fundamental difference between time and space than Callender’s own proposal.
We recognise, however, that there are really two ways of thinking about the relationship
between time, space and law. First, it might be thought that time and space exist independently
of the laws, and are such that the laws operate on time and space. Second, one might claim that
all there is to time and space is whatever is enshrined within the laws of nature. If one adopts
the second account, then the difference that Callender has isolated will be a merely contingent
feature of time and space. For the laws could be different, and if the laws could be different
then so too might the difference between time and space. If one adopts the first account, by
contrast, then any difference between time and space that appears in the laws of nature will
not be a fundamental difference. Rather, that difference will be a symptom of a metaphysically
prior difference between time and space themselves. But then it is that difference that we want
to know more about.
6 Final thoughts
If one is of an optimistic bent, then perhaps what we have said can be seen as providing a
way forward for Callender. He might simply maintain that time and space are nothing over
and above the laws of nature and just accept that the difference between time and space is a
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contingent difference. Time and space possibly differ from one another in other ways or not at
all. While the position is certainly a coherent one, we are doubtful that it is the position that
Callender was aiming for and, as already noted, it is not in line with the goal of conceptually
analysing time and space. A better solution, perhaps, is to maintain that time and space are
distinct to the laws, and then give some explanation for why it is that time is the greater
informer, and not space. What is difficult about this task – and may even render it impossible
– is the onus to provide an explanation that unbinds the features of time that make it the great
informer from those features that are merely a function of our special epistemic vantage point
in spacetime.
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